Iraq

Efforts to Avoid War

Our position was exactly that of the party that sought to open the field for Arabs and their leaders to deal with the situation, and not let it go out of their hands, neither to the Security Council nor elsewhere. We were not with the occupation, or with its continuation in any way. I was asked to go to Baghdad at that time, so I went and held talks, and things were on the way to give us an opportunity to achieve the withdrawal, and there were Iraqi promises to this effect. Iraq promised to withdraw.

The whole matter was a continuous call by the Iraqis to the Arab nation not to judge it hastily, and not to adopt a position that could lead to a reaction. We were trying to clear the atmosphere in order to achieve a result which, had it not been realised, we would have been at the forefront of those that stood against the occupation, and we would have resisted it to the limit of our ability.

Interview with Orbit Television
February 25, 1998

 

If calling on troops was the only way we were not against it. We were trying to address the issue on the Arab level, to achieve Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait, and to solve all the standing problems between these two countries, and it was our right to demand that opportunity. Should our attempts have been successful, so much the better, but we were not given the opportunity. That is what happened.

Interview with Orbit Television
February 25, 1998

 

I remembered my last meeting with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein before the Gulf War and after his occupation of brotherly Kuwait. I also recalled the Arab summit meetings which preceded that catastrophe and in which the President of Iraq continuously emphasized the need for commitment by all Arabs not to use force against each other and for commitment by all Arabs to military action against any Arab country that violates this agreement.

I remembered the letter I sent on my return from my trip to the Arab Maghreb countries in which I warned, offered advice, and expressed fear, not only over the future of Iraq but also for the future of the entire Arab Nation if the situation was not resolved before the expected explosion took place.

After this letter, his last words while bidding me farewell at the airport were: "The entire universe is against us and God is with us. Victory will be ours, so don't worry and don't trouble yourself."

My response was "Thank you. I shall return to my country feeling sad, worried and full of sorrow. What I have heard is beyond my ability to deal with. Should you need my help in something good and worthwhile, I shall be in Amman."

The catastrophe occurred and the entire nation suffered, and God knows how much we too suffered as a result of suffering of the brotherly Iraqi people. We never ceased to try and offer earnest advice to the Iraqi leadership, all to no avail. We have worked diligently, still do, and will continue to work to alleviate the suffering of the victimized (Iraqi) people as a foremost priority.

Letter to HRH Crown Prince El Hassan
February 1, 1998

 

I unfortunately am not in a position to say that I have ever really coordinated with the Iraqi president, nor has he accepted my advice; nor was I able to influence him through the entirety of the Gulf Crisis and up to this time.

Interview with French Television 3
May 16, 1993

 

From the very first hours of the crisis, I acted in accordance with our convictions derived from our Arab identity and based on loyalty to our nation. We have never wavered from the path we have followed all along, making every effort to build friendship and harmony among the Arab peoples. I have never left a stone unturned in order to enable the single Arab family to stand united on the Gulf crisis in trying to resolve it within the Arab context. We have remained on this path without despairing or isolating ourselves, because the alternative to such an Arab solution was to complicate the crisis by internationalizing it or war. We are now hearing the drums of war which are threatening us all with the most dangerous consequences.

Address to the Nation
Amman
January 15, 1991

 

Of those cracks in the Arab system, the Iraq-Kuwait dispute was, in our view, the one that should have received the greatest attention and care to resolve, because it had reached a very critical and explosive phase in an area whose regional and international importance cannot escape anyone. With goodwill and the best of intentions, we used our good offices with both sides—Iraq and Kuwait—in order to narrow their differences and help bring about an amicable solution. Unfortunately, neither our efforts nor those of the others brought the desired results. Hence, our worst fears were realized and the Gulf crisis erupted, throwing our region into a new phase of its modern history.

Address to the Military Staff College Graduation
Amman
December 9, 1990

 

In this regard we, in Jordan, decided from the very first day of the crisis that our pan-Arab duty dictated that we should not be dragged into taking sides. We held this position in order to be able to work with everyone who opted for a similar attitude to contain the problem and bury the seeds of sedition and resolve the crisis through peaceful means within an Arab framework. Our deep concern was the fear that the problem would be internationalized, thus growing in scope and complexity.

This is why we were keen to seek a peaceful resolution to this conflict within an Arab framework, based on our adherence to the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and to ensure the rights and interests of the two sisterly countries.

Address to the Military Staff College Graduation
Amman
December 9, 1990